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Over the last years, a sizeable publicity machine has been set up by governments, 
energy companies, and environmental organizations to promote reductions in domestic 
energy consumption as a way for people to help “combat global warming.”1 These 
initiatives have been criticized on various grounds, not in the least because of the lack of 
credibility of their hyperbolic claims such as the assurance that fixing energy-efficient 
lightbulbs or routinely unplugging one’s mobile telephone charger “helps repair the 
planet”2—claims that for a while were endlessly repeated on billboards, in the press, 
and so on, in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Perhaps most important, social 
critics have charged these media campaigns with trivializing the ideals of citizenship 
and public participation. Thus it has been pointed out that because of their focus on 
basic household interventions, as a way of making it “feasible” to do one’s share for the 
climate, these environmental campaigns in effect redefine civic involvement as an 
atomized, isolated, and individualistic activity. They are then seen as “privatizing” 
citizenship to the point that effective intervention on the part of the public actually 
becomes less rather than more feasible (for a discussion, see Clarke et al. 2007). 
Interestingly, however, publicity campaigns seeking to “green” the home are equally 
 vulnerable to almost the opposite criticism, namely, to the charge that they promote the 
invasion of private places by public authorities and thus amount to a “de-privatization” 
of the home. There is certainly no lack of concrete examples to support such a claim, 
such as the “DIY Repairs” communications initiative of the mayor of London, launched 
in June 2007, which offers free house visits by a “green homes concierge service” to 
provide practical advice on how to make your home more energy-efficient, and yes, to 
help “save the planet.”3 Around the same time, the department store M&S announced 
that its textiles will soon carry a new label: “Think Climate—Wash 30 C.”4 Considering 
the ubiquity of such attempts to insert environmental considerations into the fabric of 
everyday life, it certainly seems important to be able to draw on critical repertoires that 
allow us to question the intrusion of public authorities into intimate places. However, it 
seems equally important that such campaigns can be seen to problematize the 
understanding of citizenship and the distinction between the public and the private 
domain on which such critical repertoires tend to rely. 
Projects that define the home as a site where people can do their bit for the 
climate can be said to challenge certain classic assumptions regarding the proper 
locations and formats for public involvement in politics. As Andrew Dobson and Derek 
Bell (2006 [1]) have pointed out, contemporary practices of environmental citizenship 
invite consideration of the special affordances of practices that are traditionally defined 
as private for engagement with public affairs. Thus they make it clear that one of the 
defining features of environmentalism is that the sphere of “the reproduction of 
everyday life” here comes to the fore as an important setting for citizenly action. For 
this reason, environmental practices can seem to scramble the neat geometry that 
provided the scaffolding for classic republican conceptions of citizenship, as in the work 
of Aristotle and Rousseau. The republican tradition firmly anchored civic action on one 
 side of the divides between the public and the private domain, between matters of 
general concern and mere particularities, and between the lofty questions of the 
common good to which the leisurely classes dedicate themselves and the mundane 
troubles and worries that keep working men and women busy. These distinctions can 
easily start shifting around when considering environmental practices, and more 
specifically, the connections that climate change campaigns establish between this 
global issue and domestic energy practices. Moreover, such campaigns could be said to 
actively contribute to the production of confusion regarding the distinction between the 
public and the private realms. Thus it is possible to understand green-the-home 
campaigns like that of the mayor of London as an attempt to actively transform the 
intimate sphere of the household into a very public place indeed, and this not only in 
the sense that the home in these campaigns becomes subject to extensive attention from 
public entities like governments, news media, and their audiences. As mentioned, 
domestic practices here also come to be defined in terms of their impact on common 
goods like the global climate and the planet, and as private practices are thus evaluated 
in terms of their public effects, the former could be said to acquire a public aspect 
themselves. 
It may obviously be necessary to take such unsettling effects of environmental 
practices on established political distinctions into account when seeking to evaluate 
these practices. In this respect, green-the-home campaigns draw attention to yet another 
feature of environmental practices that may also deserve consideration: in these 
campaigns, material things are placed in the forefront as crucial tools or props for the 
performance of public involvement in issues. Mobile phone chargers, thermostats, 
lightbulbs, and water cookers are here presented as so many “technologies of 
citizenship” (Rose 1999) that may equip individuals to practically intervene in, or at 
 least relate to, global public affairs. These campaigns thus attribute special affordances 
to domestic technologies in terms of their ability to help bridge the divide between 
people “in here,” in the home, and issues “out there.” However, though it thus seems 
clear that the role of domestic technologies in the performance of environmental 
citizenship deserves appreciation, it is far from self-evident how we should 
conceptualize their role as mediators of public involvement in issues. The reasons for 
this should become clearer later, but it has to do with the exclusion of material things 
from civic practices in classic conceptions of citizenship alluded to earlier. According to 
the republican tradition, material practices clearly belong in the private, noncivic 
domain. Just as important, an instrumentalist explanation of the role of things in 
politics, which would straightforwardly define domestic technologies as neutral tools 
for problem solving, that is, for alleviating the causes of climate change, is not 
satisfactory for a number of reasons. Moreover, postinstrumentalist frameworks that 
have been developed in recent decades to account for the role of technology in politics 
are equally difficult to apply to this case. As I will discuss in this chapter, post-
Foucauldian studies of the politics of technology have importantly drawn attention to 
the capacity of objects to mediate political relations, but in doing so they suggested that 
this capacity is predicated on their “clandestinity,” that is to say, on the circumstance 
that technologies are not usually recognized as political agents. This requirement, 
however, clearly is not met in the case of publicity campaigns to green the home, in 
which domestic technologies feature as major protagonists on billboards, in the press, 
and so on. In this chapter, I therefore turn to the work of the pragmatist philosopher 
John Dewey to explore how to conceptualize the relation between publicity media, 
material practices, and public involvement in politics. In particular Dewey’s concept of 
the public provides a crucial conceptual resource for understanding how material 
 things may acquire the capacity to mediate people’s involvement in political affairs 
under conditions of publicity. Moreover, such a detour via the work of this classic 
pragmatist can also help to make clear how post-Foucauldian studies of technology 
contribute to the understanding of public involvement in politics. 
 
Household Devices as Technologies of Citizenship? 
 
Media campaigns that focus on doable interventions in the home can partly be 
understood as a particular solution to the problem that citizen involvement in climate 
change presents. Thus the literature on the public understanding of climate change has 
put much emphasis on the obstacles there are to the effective public communication of 
this issue such as its scientific complexity and theoretical abstractness. These features 
have been widely understood as placing climate change at a great, perhaps 
unbridgeable distance from people’s everyday concerns (Trumbo 1995; Weber 2006). 
Partly in response to this problem, several authors have pointed at the capacity of visual 
media to lift complex environmental affairs out of the domain of abstract scientific 
calculation and to transpose them into the realm of human experience (Allan [2], 
Adams, and Carter 1999; Jasanoff 2001 [3]). Resisting rationalist discourses that would 
exclude aesthetic and affective modes of concern from the “proper” registers of 
citizenship, these authors write affirmatively about the affordances of media like 
television, newspapers, and the Internet for the cultivation of environmental 
citizenship. Thus Szerszynski and Toogood (1999) have pointed at the opportunity that 
visual media provide for expanding the repertoire of civic concern with environmental 
problems to include sensory and emotive forms of sensibility, which are closer to lived 
experience. The focus on domestic practices as sites of environmental involvement can 
 be understood in the light of further elaborations or radicalizations of such claims. Phil 
Macnaghten has argued that visual imagery of natural disasters, though appealing to 
the emotions, ultimately fail to inspire sustainable forms of environmental concern in 
people. Though such natural events may be within the realm of human experience, they 
too are distant from everyday life, and they do not create room for personal agency vis-
à-vis environmental problems. Claiming that concern about environmental problems 
begins with personal experience, Macnaghten (2003, 80–81) has concluded that 
environmental publicity campaigns should “start from people’s concern for themselves, 
their families and localities as points of connection for the ‘wider’ global environmental 
issues.” Moreover, in his account, such an approach should involve a focus on feasible 
interventions: “people are seeking credible solutions, ‘in bite sized chunks,’ where the 
material effects of individual action become visible and enduring” (81). It seems no 
exaggeration to say that organizers of recent climate change campaigns that focus on 
the home have at least in some respects heeded this call. Thus the aim of the “DIY 
Repairs” campaign of the mayor of London “is to raise awareness of climate change in a 
positive ‘can do’ sense,” and the organization has justified this orientation in reference 
to survey findings that Londoners are most likely to be willing to do something for the 
environment if this does not require much effort.5 
A particular understanding of the challenge that environmental issues present 
for everyday people then seems to be involved in efforts to define the household as a 
site for the performance of “climate citizenship.” However, the preceding sociological 
accounts of this challenge do not tell us very much about the role of material entities 
like lightbulbs and phone chargers in this regard. They situate citizenship somewhere 
between “phenomenology” and “agency,” between the human experience of 
environmental problems and the practical opportunity to act on these problems. As 
 Macnaghten suggests, by redefining environmental citizenship in terms of practical 
interventions in the life world, citizenly action is displaced onto the plane of physical 
practice, where interventions have “material effects.” However, in the case of climate 
change, the notion of material or physical action on environmental problems cannot be 
understood in any straightforward sense. With respect to this issue, it is highly 
problematic to attribute to individual interventions “direct material effects” that are 
“visible” and “enduring,” to use the terms in which Macnaghten characterized 
“credible” forms of environmental citizenship. Climate change campaigns that promote 
energy saving in the home do involve attempts to make such effects more tangible, for 
instance, by providing calculations of the number of tons of CO2 in emission reductions 
that would be accomplished if a certain percentage of Londoners would “turn the 
thermostat down one degree.” But the effects this would have on climate change 
generally remain shrouded in silence. Still, it seems a mistake to conclude from this that 
the project of establishing material or physical connections with the issue of climate 
change is only marginally relevant to the campaigns that focus on greening the home. It 
precisely seems to be one of the distinctive affordances of household devices, in the 
context of climate change, that they somehow enable people to “relate” to the issue via 
material and physical linkages, that is, via the technologies that connect them with 
energy infrastructures. However, it seems difficult to account for this if we understand 
the recent focus on the home as a site for civic involvement in climate change as 
principally an attempt to bridge the phenomenological gap between citizens and the 
environment. 
The significance of domestic technologies, as material or physical objects, does 
become clearer when we consider the recent turn in climate change campaigns to the 
domestic setting in a broader political and economic context. Thus climate change today 
 serves as a major justification for large-scale projects of regulatory, financial, and 
industrial restructuring that are to facilitate the transition to a “green energy economy.” 
In this context, the home has been singled out as a major location in which this 
transition is to be undertaken. Thus around the same time that energy companies and 
governmental bodies launched climate change awareness campaigns centered on the 
home, the new U.K. prime minister, Gordon Brown, announced that the building of 
carbon-neutral homes would be a central policy objective of his government.6 In this 
context, publicity campaigns that articulate the home as a site for civic involvement in 
climate change can be understood as part of the wider project of “preparing the 
ground” for a new political-economic regime organized around sustainable energy. 
More particularly, they can be understood as helping to facilitate the emergence of the 
“green energy consumer,” a subject for which there is an obvious need in the low-
carbon economy of the future. Importantly, Elisabeth Shove could argue only a few 
years ago that the “energy user” did not really exist as such, as few people approached 
domestic practices in terms of the consumption of energy involved in them, and most 
did not pay much attention to their electricity and gas bills (Shove 2003). From this 
perspective, publicity around the “simple steps” that can be taken in the home “to help 
save energy, and the environment” can be understood as an effort to articulate 
situations in everyday life where (sustainable) energy consumption takes place and 
where, accordingly, people may adopt and cultivate a new identity as (green) energy 
consumers. Domestic technologies like energy-efficient lightbulbs and mobile phone 
chargers may then be understood as devices that can help to make energy consumption 
“legible” as part of daily life, providing the means with which the “new” activity of 
sustainable energy consumption can be performed. These devices then enable people to 
undertake, simply by installing or unplugging them, their own personal transition to 
 becoming active and responsible subjects under the new sustainable energy regime 
(Rose 1999; Shove 2007). 
Such a widening of perspective brings into view close continuities between 
environmental awareness campaigns and processes of the material organization of 
social life. Among others, it suggests that household technologies can be understood as 
material “extensions” of technologies of publicity. With the aid of publicity media, these 
devices can be repurposed as civic technologies that practically enable people to adopt 
the identity of “low-carbon” citizenship. But an approach that focuses on the role of 
“technologies of citizenship” in the management of political economic regime change 
also has important limitations insofar as it favors a reductive account of civic 
involvement in climate change. 
Thus such an approach defines citizens as subjects that principally exist in 
relation to the state, or at least to a political economic regime of “green” 
governmentality, rather than in relation to issues. That is also to say, the relations that 
people may seek to establish with an environmental problem like climate change, via 
the home, here appear as essentially mediated by political economic regimes. Indeed, 
this issue here seems to matter only to the extent that it is mobilized as a relevant 
“framing” in political and economic discourses on the transition to the low-carbon 
economy. Thus consideration of the transition to a green political economy may help us 
appreciate the significance of material practices for projects of civic involvement in 
climate change, but it leaves unclear how material connections might mediate people’s 
involvement in this issue. 
Some authors have sought to develop more constructive accounts of issues as 
objects of public involvement and the importance of publicity media in this regard. 
Thus Andrew Barry has argued that the mediatization of environmental issues, as, for 
 instance, air pollution in west London, presents an opportunity for inventive forms of 
civic engagement. He has pointed out that public reporting, however much it may be 
geared to the stabilization of problems, solutions, and identities, enables third parties, 
such as activist groups, to use the media to open up these stable definitions for criticism 
(Barry 2005). Importantly, Barry has drawn attention to the fact that such practices of 
public contestation may themselves take the form of material practices, as in the case of 
roadblocks undertaken by activist groups in southern England in the late 1990s (Barry 
2005). He describes how in situ protests in this case became media events and, under 
these conditions, the protestors could make use of the material setting (road 
construction sites surrounded by English landscape) as an instrument for the 
articulation of environmental concerns. In a review of Barry’s work, Michel Callon has 
further elaborated this point by suggesting that the articulation of nonhuman entities in 
publicity media, like air quality, presents an important enabling condition for public 
debate about environmental issues (Callon 2004). In the view of Barry and Callon, then, 
the publicization of physical and material entities in the media should not only be 
understood in terms of institutional efforts to “govern,” though this is certainly an 
important aspect of it. It also presents a condition of possibility for public involvement 
in issues to the extent that the publicization of entities enables people to relate to them 
in their capacity as members of the “public.” Barry and Callon thus open up a 
constructive approach to the mediatization of material practices in the context of 
environmental politics. However, it is also striking that in conceptualizing public 
involvement, Callon and Barry principally use discursive metaphors, characterizing it 
in terms of debate and contestation. In this respect, their studies cannot tell us to what 
extent material practices can themselves be understood as forms of public involvement 
in issues. 
  
From Clandestinity to Publicity: A “Coming Out” for the Politics of Technology 
 
That it is difficult to account for material practices as sites of public involvement in 
issues may have to do with a broader conceptual problem. It may have to do with the 
fact that in recent social and political theory, the relations between politics and material 
practice have been understood in a way that excludes consideration of publicity. Under 
the influence of Michel Foucault, sociologists have from the late 1980s onward turned 
their attention to the affordances of material arrangements and, in particular, 
technologies for the pursuit of political projects (Winner 1986; Latour 1992). An 
important assumption of this line of work has been that the success of material politics 
partly depends on a circumstance that is almost the opposite of publicization: the fact 
that things are not generally recognized as significant “agents” of politics. Thus 
Langdon Winner’s seminal text on “the politics of technology” focused on a relatively 
unassuming aspect of the built environment, traffic bridges, which were constructed in 
the 1930s on Long Island, where they prevented buses, and thereby black people, from 
visiting the peninsula. In Winner’s account, the fact that few people would suspect 
bridges of pursuing a “racist” politics comes to the fore as an important precondition 
for the production of political effects by material means. And subsequent work in the 
sociology of technology, as that of Bruno Latour (1992) on speed bumps, has equally 
suggested that the ability of technologies and material artifacts to intervene “politically” 
in the world depends on their relative unobtrusiveness, on their clandestine status, as 
active components of social and political arrangements.7 This assumption is also present 
in studies of the role of material entities in the mediation of civic relations, and more 
particularly, of energy technologies as devices of citizenship. Madeleine Akrich has 
 suggested that the installation of electricity meters in homes in Côte d’Ivoire in the 
1980s should be understood as an attempt to foster citizenship. As the government of 
Côte d’Ivoire had few resources at its disposal for involving people as citizens in the 
state, the national electricity grid became an important means for implicating people in 
the political order. Thus, in the very process in which people were enlisted as 
consumers of electricity, Akrich writes, they were also enrolled as subjects of a nation-
state in the making (Akrich 1992). Thus, in Akrich’s study, energy technology acquires 
an important role as a technology of citizenship in a context in which publicity media 
are absent. 
This preoccupation, in recent literature on the politics of technology, with the 
clandestine production of political effects may help to clarify why it is difficult to 
account for the forms it takes under conditions of publicity. Authors like Winner, 
Latour, and Akrich have done crucial work in elucidating how material practices may 
serve as sites for political intervention, but their studies exclude consideration of the 
role of publicity in this respect. As they conceive of material politics as a form of 
subpolitics that plays itself out below the threshold of public perception, their 
approaches do not help to make it clear how to conceive of the role of publicity in this 
context. One could say that the materialization of politics, in work on the politics of 
technology, coincides with its evasion from sites of publicity, its depublicization. A 
related problem with the account of the politics of technology as subpolitics, in this 
regard, is that it does not consider material politics in relation to democracy; rather, this 
line of work continues to feed suspicions that a politics pursued by material means 
presents a non-, post-, or even antidemocratic form of politics as it is clearly out of line 
with familiar understandings of democratic politics as involving collective processes of 
will formation, institutional evaluation, and public debate. Importantly, attempts to 
 address such suspicions in proposals for the “democratization” of the politics of 
technology do not necessarily dislodge the association of material politics with 
clandestine, not quite kosher, forms of intervention. This is because such proposals have 
mostly taken the form of procedural designs for events of “stakeholder participation” 
and “public debate” concerning technology, and as such they suggest that 
democratization of the politics of technology requires its displacement away from 
material practices to settings of discursive engagement (Marres 2005; de Vries 2007). In 
presenting discursive processes of negotiation and debate as the principal conditions for 
democracy, such proposals then leave the understanding of material politics itself to a 
large extent untouched. Interestingly, however, a number of authors have more recently 
begun to address questions of the place of materiality, and the nonhuman world more 
broadly, in democracy. 
Sociologists, geographers, and political theorists have over the last years drawn 
attention to the fact that modern understandings of politics and democracy limit 
participation in it to human actors (Latour 1994 [4]; Mol 1999; Whatmore 2002; Bennett 
2001). Interested in the potential gains of redressing this imbalance, these authors have 
explored the possibility of reconfiguring concepts of political community to include 
nonhuman entities. Perhaps most important, they have proposed the concept of 
“heterogeneous assemblages” as a way of taking into account that physical and material 
entities may figure as active elements in political configurations. In adopting concepts 
like this, these theorists could be said to undertake a “Gestalt switch” from a human-
centered conception of community to the notion of configurations of human and 
nonhuman entities as a notable site where politics plays itself out. This shift has the 
potential to recast many of the questions of political theory (Latour 2004a; Mol 2002; 
Bennett 2001). It suspends the belief that nonhumans can be contained in essentially 
 passive categories like the “topics” of political debate and the “means” and “objects” of 
political action; that is, it presents a break with the instrumentalist assumption that 
insofar as politics is concerned, nonhuman entities can be principally characterized in 
terms of their susceptibility, or lack thereof, to manipulation by human actors, in their 
role of participants in debate, and decision and policy makers. Focusing on 
heterogeneous assemblages is, then, a way of recognizing that nonhuman entities are 
capable of actively making a difference to the organization of social, political, and 
economic arrangements. For this reason, these authors propose, they must be taken into 
account as active elements in these arrangements. Importantly, as this line of work is 
concerned with the “coming out” of nonhumans as significant members of social and 
political formations, it encourages us to consider how nonhumans are articulated as 
such in the realm of publicity media. However, this certainly does not mean that the 
association of material politics with subpolitics is ruptured in this line of work. 
Thus some students of heterogeneous assemblages have expressed positive 
appreciation for the covert status that nonhumans enjoy in the world of politics. Thus 
Hinchliffe et al. (2005) have emphasized that the relative clandestinity of nonhumans in 
the political realm does not only signal their undesirable “marginalization” but has 
affordances as well. Perhaps most important, it opens up a space for situated 
involvements with these entities as singular beings. As nonhumans prove resistant to 
assimilation into preexisting definitions of either the subjects or the objects of policy, 
they must be engaged in their idiosyncrasy. The political affordances of clandestinity 
have also been stressed with respect to the role of physical entities in democratic 
politics. Thus, drawing on the work of Jacques Ranciere, Jane Bennett (2005) has argued 
that the location of nonhumans below the threshold of discourse enables them to 
interfere surprisingly in political force fields, an event that in her view is crucial to 
 democracy. Work on heterogeneous assemblages, then, does not necessarily dissolve 
the notion that the politics of nonhumans operates primarily on the subpolitical level. 
Indeed, it suggests that publicization of nonhuman entities may hamper rather than 
amplify their capacities to produce political effects. This position raises some difficult 
questions such as whether the commitment to recognize nonhumans as constitutive 
elements of social and political worlds does not require some kind of commitment to 
publicity as one of the principal instruments to bring such recognition about; that is, one 
can ask whether a positive appreciation of heterogeneous polities, on theoretical 
grounds, does or should not imply an appreciation of the practical means by which the 
“coming out” of heterogeneous assemblages can be realized, that is, publicity media?8 
However this may be, other work in this area has made the public articulation of 
assemblages its explicit concern. Thus, in work that has close affinities with that of 
Barry and Callon discussed earlier, Bruno Latour has proposed the notion of “matter of 
concern” to describe the emergence of issues in which human and nonhuman entities 
prove to be intimately entangled (Latour 2004b). Drawing on the example of the 
Columbus space shuttle disaster in 2003, Latour shows how in this event a tangled 
“object” was articulated, with the aid of live media, which included an impressively 
wide range of elements, from insurance companies to the gods that live in the heavens. 
His account of this process of public articulation emphasizes that as these divergent but 
entangled elements came into public view, a multiplicity of issues became subject to 
scrutiny all at once: the scientific methods of monitoring spacecrafts during flight, the 
economic question of the costs and gains of the implementation of safety measures, the 
moral issue of whether individuals should be held responsible for the accident, and the 
religious concern of how one relates to the gods in the case of human deaths. 
Importantly, this means that matters of public concern in Latour’s account are no pure 
 entities that would fit one rather than another concept of the common good but rather 
present messy bundles of things and questions of which it is still to be seen with which 
understanding of “morality” or “science” they could be made to comply. However, 
Latour’s suggestion that the emergence of a matter of concern involves the 
simultaneous “activation” of scientific, economic, political, moral, and religious issues 
raises the question of what exactly is specific about the mode of entanglement he calls a 
matter of concern, and about our way of relating to it. Importantly, Latour highlights 
that our relation to these matters—whether it takes the form of attention, interest, or 
involvement—should be understood in terms of attachment; that is, to be concerned, in 
his view, is a matter of being noticeably entangled with entities that are at risk and that 
may well put one’s mode of existence at risk. However, Latour’s account of matters of 
concern does not sharply distinguish a mode of attachment that is characteristic of 
publics or citizens, as opposed to persons in their capacity of scientific, mortal, 
economic, or private beings. 
In this way, Latour’s notion of matters of concern, like other studies of the role of 
nonhumans in politics mentioned earlier, to an extent leaves undiscussed the specific 
features of heterogeneous assemblages as objects of publicity, and of public 
involvement. In other work, Latour does develop a conception of the public, which he 
derives from the political theory of the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey 
(Latour 2004c). In Dewey’s work, Latour finds an important precedent for a definition 
of the public as an attached being, whose concerns derive from the entanglements of 
everyday life. That is also to say, Latour turns to Dewey for an alternative to the 
republican conception of the public as consisting of actors who are detached from the 
concerns of everyday life and concern themselves with matters of general as opposed to 
particular concern. Dewey’s political theory dissolves the notion of two distinct 
 domains, the public and the private, and indeed, in doing so, he directs attention to 
something that we can retrospectively recognize as “heterogeneous assemblages,” as 
one of the key sites in which political relations are constituted. Dewey’s work thus 
presents a crucial point of reference for those with an interest in developing a 
constructive account of the role of nonhuman entities in politics (Bennett 2005; Marres 
2005; Stengers 2006; Dijstelbloem 2006). However, his political theory may also be a 
helpful guide in exploring the more specific question of how to distinguish “public 
involvement,” as a mode of relating to heterogeneous assemblages, from other modes—
a question that becomes crucial when we recognize that public involvement practices 
are performed in media res and not only in dedicated domains distinct from social life. 
Thus I would like to suggest here that Dewey’s theory of the public can productively 
inform an account of material practices as sites of public involvement and of the 
importance of publicity media in this respect. Moreover, such a reading of Dewey may 
also help to make it clearer what the distinctive contribution of studies of heterogeneous 
assemblages to the study of public involvement in politics consists of. 
 
John Dewey’s Heterogeneous Public 
 
Those with an interest in the roles of nonhumans in politics are certainly not the only 
ones to have turned to the political theory of John Dewey in recent years. A wide range 
of authors in contemporary political theory draw on his work for a variety of purposes: 
to expand and strengthen the deliberative conception of democracy as anchored in 
public debate (Festenstein 1997), to establish the importance of technological innovation 
as an occasion for public participation experiments (Keulartz et al. 2002), or to 
conceptualize minority politics as a practice grounded in experience and not doctrine 
 (Glaude 2007). However, recent readings of Dewey’s political theory, and in particular 
of his theory of the public, in the light of work on the role of nonhumans in politics offer 
a distinctive interpretation. As they highlight that Dewey conceived of the “public” as 
constituted by materially and physically embedded actors, they break with an 
assumption shared by many interpreters of his work, namely, that to participate in a 
public is principally a matter of participating in discursive exchange (Marres 2007). As 
will become clearer later, such differences among interpretations can to a great extent be 
accounted for in terms of the different books, or even passages of books, on which 
different interpretations focus. Thus Dewey (1927) introduced his “heterogeneous 
public” in the first chapters of The Public and Its Problems. The book opens with the 
outline of a speculative history of the emergence of political formations, and befittingly, 
Dewey develops an account of the public as emerging from the ever-shifting relations 
between humans and nonhumans as part of this historical exposé. The public, Dewey 
argues here, can be defined as a particular type of distribution of the consequences of 
human action: “the public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect 
consequences of transactions, to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those 
consequences systematically cared for” (15). 
A lot is packed into this brief definition, with the noteworthy nonhumans 
hiding, for the moment, in the notion of the consequences of action that actors are 
harmfully, or at least disturbingly, affected by. But it seems most useful to begin picking 
Dewey’s concept of the public apart by considering how it resists reduction to another 
familiar understanding of the public, even if it bears similarities to it. Thus Dewey’s 
public can in some respects be understood as an elaboration of the liberal ideal that says 
that the interference of government in private affairs should be limited to those 
situations in which persons suffer as a consequence of the actions of third parties. 
 Dewey, one could say, transformed this regulative principle, designed to limit state 
involvement in “private matters,” into a constructive principle that can account for the 
empirical process of the formation of publics—and that indeed extends the range and 
number of empirically existing publics in comparison to other definitions. Dewey does 
this by concentrating on the type of consequences that in his view call the particular 
figure of the public into existence. These are consequences that are (1) harmful or even 
“evil” (Dewey 1927, 17), (2) indirect, and (3) extensive and enduring. And in focusing 
on these effects, Dewey dismantles the particular opposition between the public and the 
private that is central to this liberal project of restricting “incursions” of the former into 
the latter. (That is also to say, Dewey was at least as much concerned with questioning 
liberal as republican concepts of the public.) 
Thus, rather than presenting us with two domains, one in which we deal with 
personal matters and another in which we deal with common affairs, Dewey presents a 
world in which actions continuously produce actor groupings by way of their effects, 
some of which will go by the name of “public.” Dewey singles out two critical features 
of such public-generating effects: he distinguishes first between consequences that are 
direct and can thus be controlled by those involved in their production and those that 
cannot, and second between consequences that are erratic and somehow can be 
accommodated as part of social life and those that produce enduring harm. 
Consequences that have the latter features generate publics. Dewey thus exhaustively 
defines the public in terms of a particular chain of effects, which can be differentiated 
from other such chains, but both of which proliferate across one and the same worlds. 
Thus, as he situates the public in effects and affects that are continuously produced as 
part of daily life, the notion that the public refers to a domain that exists apart from 
private worlds loses much of its sense. Moreover, Dewey is clear that the type of 
 consequences that produce publics can be expected to be generated everywhere all the 
time. He inferred from this that problems of democracy are in fact not likely to stem 
from a shortage of publics but rather from their radical multiplication and excess (126). 
Thus, far from limiting the breadth and scope of the public, in line with the classic 
liberal objective, Dewey radically extends them. Furthermore, Dewey could also be said 
not just to redefine the opposition between public and private but to replace it with a 
different one; that is, in some respects, it makes little sense to oppose Dewey’s public to 
the “private.” In Dewey’s account, the event of “incursion,” that is, when people 
experience harmful indirect effects, does not present a situation in which private actors 
are threatened by an external force. It rather transforms social actors who more or less 
“routinely” went about their daily lives into a public that must take it upon itself to 
organize into an external force (vis-à-vis the actions that must be intervened in, if 
harmful effects are to be addressed). Thus, rather than the intrusion of the public into 
the private, the central event of his account of the public appears to be the rupture of 
habitual ways of doing, which results in the formation of a public. In Dewey’s account, 
the state of being harmfully affected by events beyond actors’ control requires the 
formation of a collective agency and, more generally, the need to get involved in 
something like politics. Dewey’s theory of the public could thus be said to replace the 
opposition between the private and public domain with the notion of a shift from 
working social routines to their disruption. 
Importantly, Dewey’s emphasis on the disruptive events in which publics come 
into existence also sets his account apart from other consequentialist approaches to 
morality and politics such as utilitarianism. Dewey did follow utilitarianism by 
concentrating on consequences, but he certainly did not subscribe to its conception of 
politics as principally concerned with the maximalization of “agreeable” consequences 
 of action and the prevention of disagreeable ones. In other work, Dewey expressed 
great appreciation for the fact that utilitarianism, by focusing on the consequences of 
action, was able to recognize the “empirical character” of morality and politics. But he 
was extremely critical of the utilitarianist notion that it is possible to calculate future 
consequences of action and also of the distinction between means and ends on which 
such a calculative approach is predicated (Dewey 1922); that is, Dewey rejected the 
utilitarianist definition of politics and morality as concerned with the determination of 
the proper means that will help to realize specifiable desired ends because he could not 
accept the instrumentalist’s carving up of the world into means and ends that this 
implied. He criticized the role that the means-end distinction was made to play in 
politics and morality by utilitarianists because of the way in which it precluded 
recognition of the fact that things designated as “means” are likely to have 
consequences that are not included among its “ends.” To approach such things as 
“mere means” to “certain ends only” for Dewey presented a disingenuous justification 
for excluding these consequences from consideration (222–27). (This is also to say, while 
Dewey called his own philosophy instrumentalism, it is clear that he meant something 
quite different than the utilitarian brand of “means-ism.”) In The Public and Its Problems, 
this criticism of the notion of “mere means” also returns, when Dewey highlights the 
relevance for politics of the situation in which things that are designed to function as 
means of human action produce unanticipated effects. Indeed, it is in his discussion of 
this situation that Dewey comes to recognize the formative influence of nonhuman 
entities on the organization of publics. Thus, in specifying the conditions in which 
publics come about, Dewey directs attention to the tendency of technological means not 
only to produce consequences that cannot be classified among those that are desired but 
also to produce new types of consequences: “industry and invention in technology, for 
 example, create means which alter the modes of associated behavior and which 
radically change the quantity, character, and place of impact of their indirect 
consequences” (30). 
Passages like this help to make clear how a definition of the public in terms of a 
particular type of consequence involves recognition of the role of nonhuman entities in 
the formation of publics. First, it highlights Dewey’s conviction that it is unhelpful to 
define nonhuman entities as mere means in the political context. Technologies, 
substances, and objects play a crucial role in the formation of publics because they 
actively participate in the production of the consequences that call publics into 
existence. Second, it also shows that Dewey includes, or even privileges, among the 
consequences that produce publics material and physical effects that have to do with 
activities like manufacture, transport, and communication. Indeed, one of Dewey’s aims 
in The Public and Its Problems is to direct attention to changes in “the material conditions 
of life” as a crucial occasion for the formation of publics (Dewey 1927, 44) and for the 
development of democratic societies more broadly. Thus, by defining the public in 
terms of adversely affected actors, Dewey suggests that we should look for a 
distinctively public mode of association not, in first instance, in features like shared 
membership in clubs and other social associations or in shared discourses. We should 
rather focus on the social fact of the joint implication of actors in the infrastructures, 
technological, natural, and otherwise, that sustain social life. In this respect, it is 
important to note that Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems is for a large part concerned 
with problems of democracy in technological societies. By defining the public as he 
does, Dewey in effect breaks with the tendency in political theory to model the public 
on preindustrial communities of either the aristocratic or agricultural variety. Dewey 
does not, at least not initially, mold his public after a particular social community, be it 
 the community of notables (citizens of the polis) or the New England village (meeting in 
the town hall). He opens up the concept to the ever-shifting and complex 
interdependencies that are characteristic of industrial societies. 
However, Dewey’s emphasis on the material and physical connections by which 
publics, in his view, are held together does not entail a disregard for the importance of 
discourse. Interestingly, and it could make sense to call this Dewey’s genius, he makes it 
clear that the “material public” conceptualized by him needs more rather than less 
publicity to sustain itself, compared with communities that are principally held together 
by discursive or social bonds. The notion of publics called into existence by material 
effects opens up the possibility that publics proliferate in the absence, or below the 
surface, of the usual support systems that these other publics require: a shared way of 
life, discourse, institutions, assembly spaces, publicity media. But in The Public and Its 
Problems, Dewey utterly refuses to view this possibility of what could perhaps be called 
the subpolitical mode of existence of the public in a positive light. Instead he argues that 
publics that configure around the harmful consequences of human action depend for 
their survival and their “effectivity” on publicity media. In Dewey’s view, material 
publics are condemned to lead only an inchoate, obscure, staggering, and unstable 
existence, as long as they remain aloof from the symbolic circulations facilitated by 
publicity media, and this for at least two reasons. First, the consequences that call 
publics into existence are unlikely to be recognizable as such if they are not documented 
in information media. This is because these consequences, being indirect, are likely to 
transgress the boundaries of existing social groupings. In industrial societies, moreover, 
with their longer and more complex associative chains, these effects also tend to be 
extensive, connecting actors that are separated from one another by long distances. And 
they should be expected to contain an element of novelty. From this Dewey infers that 
 in the absence of attempts to trace indirect and harmful consequences with the aid of 
information technologies, the formation of a public is likely to go unobserved (Dewey 
1927, 177). Second, it also follows that a public is unlikely to recognize itself as long as 
the effects that call it into being are not made widely observable. As Deweyian publics 
are not likely to map onto existing social groupings, they should be expected to consist 
of strangers who do not have at their disposal shared locations, vocabularies, and habits 
for the resolution of common problems (Warner 2002; Dobson and Bell 2006). From this 
Dewey concluded that if publics are to “recognize themselves,” platforms for the wide 
and open-ended circulation of information concerning consequences must be in place. 
And more generally, he argued that an extensive and developed communication 
infrastructure is a central requirement for the organization of publics. It thus seems fair 
to say that he was not in the least seduced by the political possibilities inherent in an 
exclusively subpolitical form of organization for which his concept of material publics 
can seem to allow. Publicity in his view was an absolutely necessary condition for the 
endurance or sustainability of material publics, that is, if they were to develop 
capacities to “hold themselves,” as well as for any possible effective action on the part 
of the public. 
This brings us to a point at which Dewey’s theory of the public at once touches 
most closely on questions in contemporary political theory regarding materiality and 
politics and begins to recede from them. On one hand, Dewey’s concept of material 
publics—and, perhaps especially, his claim that they depend for their sustenance and 
effectivity on the publicization of the effects that call them into existence—seems to 
contain the seeds of answers to these questions. It suggests how a special combination 
of material effects, intimate affectedness, and mediatization comes together in the figure 
of the public. It distinguishes, within the wider field of subpolitical formations 
 involving things, humans, and environments, a particularly problematic type of 
entanglement of humans and nonhumans, simply and elegantly called “public,” the 
articulation of which requires publicity. I will further discuss subsequently how these 
Deweyian concepts can help to address a number of conceptual complications 
regarding materiality and citizenship. However, on the other hand, it should also be 
noted that Dewey’s claims about the dependency of material publics on publicity media 
present the point in The Public and Its Problems at which his argument starts to be less 
and less relevant to these complications. Indeed, it seems that, partly because of his 
preoccupation with the communicative dimension of the public, Dewey was unable to 
fully appreciate its heterogeneous character. Thus, once Dewey has established the 
importance of informational and communicative practices in this book, his account 
begins to move away from the idea that the public is constituted by human as well as 
nonhuman entities. Indeed, it subsequently becomes clear that Dewey in certain 
respects remains firmly committed to a humanist understanding of the public.9 Thus, in 
The Public and Its Problems, he eventually comes to define social and political groupings 
in terms of the “conjoint activity of humans.” Moreover, in doing so, he makes the 
demarcationist move of distinguishing human communities from nonhuman ones 
rather than continuing to explore their mutual imbrications. He places great emphasis 
on humans’ exclusive mastery of language and symbolic communication. Dewey thus 
ultimately came to define political groupings in terms of associations among 
distinctively human beings, and the notion that nonhuman entities make a difference to 
the political formations they help to constitute disappears from his argument. That is 
also to say, Dewey at no point addresses the question whether the participation of 
nonhumans in the public has consequences for the forms that practices of publicity may 
take. However, in the context of the recent turn to material practices as sites of 
 citizenship, this seems to be one of the central questions raised by Dewey’s theory of the 
public: once we recognize that publics are heterogeneously constituted, must not 
publicity itself—the process in which publics come to “recognize themselves” and 
somehow acquire the capacity to act—be rethought along materialist lines? 
Before further discussing what inferences can be made from Dewey’s political 
theory regarding this question, I want to briefly point out that in other work, Dewey 
did emphasize the special affordances of objects as mediators of normative engagement. 
Thus, in his Theory of Valuation, Dewey (1939) developed a moral theory that without 
much exaggeration can be characterized as object oriented. Here he proposes that 
values as well as the desires and interests that guide their articulation are first and 
foremost attached to objects and that they are most productively defined in terms of 
those objects. Interestingly, Theory of Valuation was published in the famous series 
edited by the Viennese logical positivists, The Encyclopedia of Unified Science, and its 
general argument can be understood in relation to the commitments of logical 
positivism. Thus one could say that Dewey, in this little book, presents an alternative to 
the positivist project of purifying the domain of factual truth and excluding from it 
anything “subjective,” which logical positivists famously equated with thoughts and 
feelings that are merely “confused.” In sharp contrast to this, Dewey proposed to 
include affectations, whether confused or not, in the objective realm. As he puts it 
elsewhere, “such things as lack and need, conflict and clash, desire and effort, loss and 
satisfaction [must be] referred to reality” (Dewey 1908, XX [5]). In Theory of Valuation, he 
specifies this general claim by suggesting that values, desires, and interests must be 
appreciated as aspects of “objective situations.” These normativities in his view first and 
foremost connote “an active relation to the environment” (Dewey 1939, 16); they must 
be stated “in terms of the objects and events that give rise to [them]” (16); and the 
 tendency to define them as “something merely personal” must be resisted (16). For 
Dewey, the content of “values” is then best conceptualized in terms of the specific 
situational objects to which people attach them, and he suggests that processes of 
valuation should themselves be understood as processes in which the worth of this type 
of objects becomes clear. Thus, regarding interests, Dewey states, “When [they] are 
examined in their concrete makeup in relation to their place in some situation, it is plain 
that everything depends on the objects involved in them” (18). This is not the place to 
examine this moral theory in detail. But I hope that this brief sketch is enough to make it 
clear that Dewey’s philosophy contains further conceptual elements to help account for, 
if not material, then at least object-oriented practices as sites of normative engagement. 
One last point, which Dewey derives from his object-oriented conception of values, 
seems especially relevant in this respect. This conception led him to express a strong 
commitment to action as the appropriate register for the expression of value. As he put 
it, “the measure of a value a person attaches to a thing is not what he says about its 
preciousness, but the care he devotes to obtaining and using the means without which it 
cannot be attained” (27). 
Thus Dewey’s object-oriented understanding of values led him to foreground 
practical efforts to obtain valued things as a privileged mode of moral action. He was 
critical, certainly not of moral discourses in general, but of a particular tendency in the 
expression of moral sentiment, one that ends up “merely wishing” that “things were 
different” (Dewey 1939, 15). The problem with wishing, Dewey points out elsewhere, is 
that it may all too easily entail a disregard of the issues people are confronted by, as 
people “tend to dislike what is unpleasant and so to sheer off from an adequate notice 
of that which is especially annoying” (Dewey 1933, XX [6]). For Dewey, valuation 
crucially involved an acceptance of the practical costs of engaging what he famously 
 called problematic situations, those involving “lack and need, conflict and clash, desire 
and effort, loss and satisfaction.” 
 
The Particularity of Material Politics 
 
Dewey’s philosophy is a productive one also in the sense that there can easily seem to 
be no end to the connections that can be explored between his various concepts. But I 
hope that the preceding goes some way toward making clear how his theory of the 
public can help to elucidate contemporary questions about the relations between 
materiality and publicity. It can do so not in the least because it opens up a perspective 
on the role of materiality in politics that breaks with the tendency, present in post-
Foucauldian work on the subject, to understand this role as antithetical to publicity. 
Crucially, to adopt the Deweyian concept of “material publics” does not imply a 
rejection of the association of material politics with clandestinity, with the idea of a 
force at work below the surface of publicized reality; rather, Dewey’s The Public and Its 
Problems proposes that among the many different types of human and nonhuman 
entanglements that exist, there is a distinctive type, simply and elegantly called public, of 
which the articulation requires publicity. This also means that Dewey’s work raises a 
slightly different question than the one on which authors concerned with the politics of 
technology have focused. The latter were interested in the question whether 
assemblages of humans and nonhumans can be ascribed a politics generally speaking 
(Harbers 2005). By contrast, Dewey directs attention to a specific type of assemblage to 
describe how heterogeneous assemblages may become politically charged. Because of 
this, Dewey’s theory of the public also opens up an alternative interpretation of the idea 
of subpolitics. The latter notion has been criticized for suggesting that politics happens 
 everywhere all the time, and it has therefore been said to contribute to the dismantling 
of the concept of politics (de Vries 2007). Such a critique gives rise to the temptation to 
confine the politics of technology to a particular institutional domain, where the 
specificity of politics can be safeguarded. In contrast to this, Dewey’s concept of the 
public suggests that it is certainly not necessary to relegate politics to a separate 
domain, if the point is to acknowledge its specificity. Indeed, the project of restricting 
politics to an institutional domain is precisely the kind of classic liberal move that 
Dewey’s concept of the infrapublic is designed to undermine. This concept captures the 
specificity of political relations by directing attention to a particular mode of association 
among social actors: that of being jointly affected by actions beyond their control. 
Furthermore, though Dewey rejects the understanding of the public in terms of a 
separate domain, he nevertheless emphasizes that there is something distinctive about 
being implicated in heterogeneous assemblages as a member of the public. In his account, 
the public’s position is marked by a special combination of being both an insider and an 
outsider to public affairs. Thus Deweyian publics are internal to public affairs to the 
extent that they are intimately affected by social problems, which put their livelihood, in 
the broad sense, at stake. But they occupy an external position to the extent that the 
sources of social problems are beyond their reach and control, and, we should add, so 
are the resources required to address them. In this way, Dewey makes it clear that the 
public’s mode of involvement in social problems should be differentiated from those of 
social actors and other particular actors like professionals. This distinction is not always 
made in studies of heterogeneous assemblages, which tend to focus on the situated 
involvements of various social actors in them. Also relevant in this respect is that it is 
Dewey’s insight in the singularity of the public’s position that subsequently leads him 
to recognize the importance of publicity media. The location of the public as both an 
 insider and outsider to social problems raises the question of how such a position can be 
sustained, and Dewey’s answer is to point at publicity media. He arrives at the 
intriguing position that the existence of material publics, which are called into being by 
harmful consequences, depends at least partly on their articulation in media. Because 
the effects that call publics into existence are so obscure—that is, precisely because they 
present “clandestine” formations—Dewey suggests, they can only exist coherently in 
these distributed, formal, artificial platforms. As I mentioned, Dewey’s recognition of 
the importance of publicity media led him away from his earlier concerns with the 
materialities that mediate the formation of publics. But his initial account of their role 
does suggest an approach to material practices as sites for public involvement. Taking a 
cue from Theory of Valuation, in which Dewey argued in favor of practical interventions 
as a mode of normative involvement in things, we can ask whether this argument 
cannot be extended to the mode of involvement characteristic of the public. Thus, in the 
light of Dewey’s definition of the public in terms of its state of “being affected” by 
public affairs, object-oriented practices appear to have special affordances. The Public 
and Its Problems makes it clear that this state of “affectedness” cannot be adequately 
understood in factual terms only but also refers to the affective states of being touched, 
implicated, and indeed moved in the sense of being mobilized by public affairs. So how 
is the state of affectedness that is characteristic of the public performed and made 
productive? Specific objects may have crucial enabling features in this respect. 
But before saying a final word about the affordances of material things for the 
performance of public involvement in issues, I would like to point out that studies of 
heterogeneous assemblages in their turn also suggest a particular elaboration of 
Dewey’s theory of the public. This is because these studies have a particular way of 
dealing with critiques of “naive objectivism,” to which Dewey’s pragmatism has been 
 subjected. They accommodate these critiques without letting go of the object-oriented 
approach that is characteristic of Dewey’s philosophy, as has been rather more 
customary. Thus Dewey’s political theory has been called historically dated, on the 
ground that his objectivist approach to democracy can no longer be maintained, for 
historical, epistemic, and political reasons. Sheldon Wolin (2004) and Yaron Ezrahi 
(1990) have emphasized that Dewey promoted a scientific approach to democracy that 
aimed to transform politics and morality into objective practices, dedicated to tracing, 
documenting, and remedying “harmful” consequences rather than to subjective 
processes of will formation and making value judgments. Such a characterization makes 
Dewey’s pragmatism seem more utilitarian and positivistic than is perhaps justified. 
But it is certainly not entirely wrong. Wolin has described how Dewey’s problem-
centric understanding of democracy became problematized historically: the adoption of 
a problem-centric approach by progressive U.S. administrations after the Second World 
War did not result in the type of enlightened, participatory form of rule to which 
Dewey was committed (Wolin 2004, 518–19). Thus Dewey’s object-oriented politics, 
Wolin suggests, came down in practice to a form of technocratic government that 
idealized expert-driven forms of policy making dedicated to narrowly defined ideals of 
“problem solving.” Ezrahi has pointed out that Dewey’s objectivist understanding of 
politics also became problematic toward the end of the twentieth century, epistemically 
speaking. His belief in the traceability of “harmful” consequences, he notes, involves a 
commitment to an empiricist ideal of accountability, that is, a belief in the possibility of 
documenting events and “locating the trouble” without getting caught up in confusing 
complexities involving interests, obscure motives, and political games of assigning 
blame. This kind of empiricism has become deeply problematic, if not untenable, Ezrahi 
points out, as the constructivist commitment to recognize the influence of “paradigms” 
 and “frames” on the formulation of facts has become widely adopted. Finally, both 
Ezrahi and Wolin have pointed at the political impossibility of Dewey’s objectivist ideal 
of democracy. As Wolin puts it, democracy inevitably involves the clashing of views 
and interests and upheavals having to do with struggles for influence, and Dewey’s 
scientific understanding of democracy failed to make room for such events (Wolin 
2004). 
As mentioned, one possible response to these critiques is to point out that 
Dewey was not the utilitarian or positivist that he is sometimes taken for, designations 
that the preceding critiques perhaps do not do enough to dispel. However, it seems 
equally important to recognize that the preceding “problematizations” of Dewey’s 
philosophy tend to result in a stalling or even a reversal of the objectivist turn that he 
proposed. Thus Sheldon Wolin concludes his essay on the fate of Dewey’s scientific 
ideal of democracy in the late twentieth century by advocating a return to the ideal of 
solidarity, as it was expressed in the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s. In this 
context, the attempts of students of heterogeneous assemblages to adapt Dewey’s 
political theory to their purposes present a clear alternative. This line of work has been 
committed to demonstrating that it is possible to address critiques of positivism and 
utilitarianism, while further radicalizing the object-oriented approaches that these 
schools of thought opened up. Thus the notion of heterogeneous assemblages has been 
developed as part of a broader critique of instrumentalism: it is all about recognizing 
the fragility, volatility, and recalcitrance of entities, both human and nonhuman, in the 
face of attempts to define them as means toward pregiven ends. However, in this case, 
the critique of instrumentalism does not lead to less but rather more attention being 
paid to the capacities of objects to mediate political relations. 
 
 To Conclude 
 
But what about the home as a site of public involvement in climate change? Dewey’s 
theory of the public, when read through the lens of recent studies of heterogeneous 
assemblages, suggests a particular approach to the role of domestic technologies in this 
regard, namely, to consider them as “devices of affectedness.” We then enrich Dewey’s 
definition of the public as held together by the indirect and intimate connections that 
make up social problems with a decidedly postinstrumentalist emphasis on the active 
role of things in the mediation of political relations. From such a perspective, energy 
technologies in the home, like thermostats and water cookers, may perhaps be ascribed 
special affordances for the performance of the specific mode of involvement in social 
problems that is characteristic of the public, that of being both intimately and externally 
affected by issues. It is then certainly not impossible that the little act of “turning down 
the thermostat” deserves appreciation as a more or less successful attempt, not to save 
the planet, but to transform the state of being affected by the “impossible” issue of 
climate change into a viable practice. In the light of the various critiques of 
instrumentalism discussed earlier, it is clear that the affordances of domestic settings for 
the articulation of the material and physical modes of being implicated in climate 
change cannot possibly be approached in the register of facticity as given; that is, the 
capacities of domestic energy technologies to mediate involvement in climate change 
can only be understood, to use Dewey’s vocabulary, as a situational achievement. The 
material and technological arrangements that make up homes must then be examined 
further, if we are to determine their relative capacities for dramatizing connections 
between practices “in here” and changing climates “out there.” Perhaps it is not 
completely anachronistic to suggest that Dewey has made it clear that the capacity of 
 the home to function as a device of issue affectedness depends crucially on the 
articulation of connections, between domestic practices and issues out there, in 
publicity media. Whether recent publicity campaigns, with their focus on a limited 
number of feasible, stereotypical interventions—washing at low temperatures, 
unplugging mobile phone chargers—succeeded in mediating affective relations with 
climate change, and thus in bringing the issue home, must remain an open question 
here. However, to leave this question open is to consider it a real possibility that the 
endless repetition of suggestions of “what you can do” activates a different, more 
classic function of the home: that of a machine of disaffectedness, which has the special 
affordance of providing shelter against the lures and risks of public life, not the least of 
which seems to be hyperbole and thereby the loss of connection with its objects. 
 
Notes 
                                         
1 The strong language was used by British Gas as part of its advertising campaign 
“Make It Greener Where You Are,” http://www.makeitgreenernow.co.uk/. 
2 As the campaign “DIY Planet Repairs” of the mayor of London claimed; see “Make 
Six Small Changes to Help Repair the Planet Says Mayor,” press release, Mayor of 
London, June 6, 2007, 
http://www.london.gov.uk/view_press_release.jsp?releaseid=12230. 
3 The GREENhomes Concierge service, http://www.london.gov.uk/diy/offers/green-
homes.jsp [7]. 
4 “M&S Helps Customers to ‘Think Climate’ by Relabelling Clothing,” press release, 
Marks and Spencer, April 23, 2007, 
http://www.marksandspencer.com/gp/browse.html?ie=UTF8&node=55319031&no=5
                                                                                                                                    
1444031&mnSBrand=core&me=A2BO0OYVBKIQJM; see also 
http://www.together.com/solutions/9. 
5 Marketing Plan: Planet DIY Repairs, Mayor of London, May 2007. 
6 “Brown Outlines ‘Eco Towns’ Plan,” BBC News, May 13, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6650639.stm. 
7 Latour and other actor-network theorists have been criticized in the past for giving too 
much credit to nonhumans by effectively approaching them as “actors.” Such a critique, 
it seems to me, does not sufficiently appreciate that actor-network theorists tend to limit 
the agency of nonhumans to “acts” that are precisely not conventionally defined as 
such. 
8 Another way of phrasing this problem is that work on heterogeneous assemblages 
does not always provide a clear answer to the question of whether these assemblages 
are best appreciated as polities by designation only or whether the shift in perspective it 
proposes also invites or necessitates appreciation of attempts at the articulation of 
assemblages as “objects of politics” in social, political, and public settings. 
9 This is also suggested by the fact that Dewey excluded natural events from the range 
of actions that could bring a public into existence. Only human deeds could in his 
account give rise to a political community. This limitation may have to do with Dewey’s 
understanding of politics in terms of care for consequences, as an intrinsically human 
capability. But considering the centrality of “harmful indirect effects” to his definition 
of the public, it is hard to see how Dewey could deem it justified. 
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